The Post-Green Tree Evidentiary Standard for Invalidating Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Lending Contracts: How Much Justice Can You Afford by Kay, Jason Bradley
NORTH CAROLINA
BANKING INSTITUTE
Volume 6 | Issue 1 Article 19
2002
The Post-Green Tree Evidentiary Standard for
Invalidating Arbitration Clauses in Consumer
Lending Contracts: How Much Justice Can You
Afford
Jason Bradley Kay
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncbi
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Banking Institute by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jason B. Kay, The Post-Green Tree Evidentiary Standard for Invalidating Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Lending Contracts: How Much
Justice Can You Afford, 6 N.C. Banking Inst. 545 (2002).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncbi/vol6/iss1/19
The Post-Green Tree E ideniary Standard for Envalidafing
_ibtatfn Causes in Consumer Lending Contracts: How Much
Jus tce Cm You AffKrd?
I. INTRODUCTION
Among the liberties secured by the Constitution is the right
to have suits at common law decided by a jury.' The enactment
of the Federal Arbitration Acte (FAA) in 1925 produced a
critical qualification to this right, alloving commercial entities to
agree to resolve a contractual dispute through binding arbitration
agreements In Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama 1.
Randolph, the Supreme Court announced that, for consumers, the
right to a trial by jury had been further qualified Even where the
costs of arbitration are potentially so high as to preclude the
consumer from vindicating her statutory rights, a contractual
L See U.S. CONsT. amend. VII (stating that -[i]n suits at common law, where
the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall bz
preserved .... ).
2. Congress originally enacted the FAA in 1925 to encourage the resolution of
private disputes in a private arbitral forum. See Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration and
Unconscionability After Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 31 VAiE FOREST L.
REv. 1001, 1004 (1996). Congress reenacted the FAA in 1947 as 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15
(1947). Section 2 of the FAA provides that arbitration clauses are -valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2 (20U0). Section 3 further allows the
party seeking enforcement to obtain a stay or an order compelling arbitration if the
opposing party refuses. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2000). Courts were initially reluctant to enforce
these sections of the FAA when arbitration clauses were used in "public interest"
areas such as employment discrimination, antitrust, and securities. Ware, Arbitration
and Unconscionability,, supra, at 1004. But the Supreme Court later ruled that
arbitration agreements must be enforced regardless of the contractual area b.cause
the agreements were basic contractual provisions and, therefore, generally
applicable. Id. at 1005. Since that time, courts generally have enforced arbitration
clauses when they appear in any contract. Sce, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate Johnson
Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrnsler Plymouth,
Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
3. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
4. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 91 (2000) (holding that
a standard, non-negotiable consumer loan agreement containing an arbitration clause
was enforceable against the consumer, despite its silence as to the apportionment of
arbitration fees) [hereinafter Green Tree III].
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agreement to arbitration, even in an adhesion contract, is still
enforceable.' The Court required that when "a party seeks to
invalidate an arbitration agreement on the ground that arbitration
would be prohibitively expensive, that party bears the burden of
showing the likelihood of incurring such costs."' 6 In announcing
this standard, the Court left open the possibility that an arbitration
clause could be invalidated because of inordinately high
arbitration costs for the consumer What evidence is necessary to
show such prohibitive costs, however, was left provocatively
unspecified
This Note begins with an exploration of the procedural
history and holding of the Supreme Court's decision in Green
Tree.9 The next section of the Note discusses the legal and policy
considerations serving as a foundation to the Green Tree
decision. ° The Note then identifies and analyzes the emerging
evidentiary standard for what constitutes a showing of prohibitive
costs, I' followed by a discussion of the implications of the
emerging evidentiary standard for lenders and consumers. 2 The
Note concludes that although the Green Tree III holding
significantly strengthens the enforceability of arbitration clauses,
lenders must beware that arbitration clauses imposing unduly
burdensome costs on consumers may yet be invalidated. 3
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
At issue in Green Tree III was whether an arbitration
clause contained within a consumer loan agreement was
enforceable despite the clause's silence as to the apportionment of
potentially substantial arbitration costs incurred in vindicating a
5. Id. at 79 ("the 'risk' that [the plaintiff] will be saddled with prohibitive costs is
too speculative to justify invalidation of an arbitration agreement").
6. Id. at 92.
7. Id. at 91 ("It may well be that the existence of large arbitration costs could
preclude a litigant such as [the plaintiff] from effectively vindicating her federal
statutory rights in the arbitral forum.").
& Id. at 71.
9. See infra notes 14-71 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 72-127 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 128-62 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 163-88 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 189-200 and accompanying text.
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federal statutory claim in an arbitral forum. 4 Larketta Randolph
bought a mobile home financed through defendant Green Tree
Financial Corporation. 5 The loan agreement contained a clause
requiring her to forgo litigating a claim against Green Tree and
binding her to resolve any potential disputes through arbitration.,'
Upon Randolph's alleged discovery of Green Tree's failure to
disclose a finance charge required by the Truth in Lending Act
(TILA),17 and for violating the Equal Credit Opportunity Act
(ECOA) by requiring her to arbitrate her statutory cause of action
under TILA,5 Randolph filed suit in federal court."' Green Tree
moved to compel arbitration.0
14. Green Tree IIlL 531 U.S. at S9.
15. 1& at 82.
16. Id. at 83 n.1. The arbitration agreement stated:
All disputes, claims, or controversies arising from or relating to
this Contract or the relationships which result from this Contract,
or the validity of this arbitration clause or the entire contract, shall
be resolved by binding arbitration by one arbitrator selected by
Assignee with consent of Buyer(s). This arbitration Contract is
made pursuant to a transaction in interstate commerce, and shall
be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act at 9 U.S.C. Section 1.
Judgment upon the award rendered may be entered in any court
having jurisdiction. The parties agree and understand that they
choose arbitration instead of litigation to resolve disputes. The
parties understand that they have a right or opportunity to litigate
disputes through a court, but that they prefer to resolve their
disputes through arbitration, except as provided herein. THE
PARTIES VOLUNTARILY AND KNOWINGLY WAIVE
ANY RIGHT THEY HAVE TO A JURY TRIAL EITHER
PURSUANT TO ARBITRATION UNDER THIS CLAUSE OR
PURSUANT TO A COURT ACTION BY ASSIGNEE (AS
PROVIDED HEREIN). The parties agree and understand that all
disputes arising under case law, statutory law, and all other laws,
including, but not limited to. all contract, tort, and property
disputes, will be subject to binding arbitration in accord with this
Contract. The parties agree and understand that the arbitrator
shall have all powers provided by the la, and the Contract.
Id.
17. 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2000). Randolph claimed that Green Tree violated
TILA by failing to disclose in the contract the -vendors single interest" insurance
charge of $15.00 annually. Randolph v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 991 F. Supp. 1410,
1415 (M.D. Ala. 1997) [hereinafter Green Tree 1].
18. 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2000). Section 1691 provides that -(a) It shall be unlavful
for any creditor to discriminate against any applicant, with respect to any aspect of a
credit transaction... (3) because the applicant has in good faith exercised any right
under this chapter." § 1691(a)(3). Randolph claimed that Green Tree violated the
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A. District Court-Green Tree I
In analyzing Green Tree's motion to compel arbitration,
the district court first addressed whether enforcement of the
arbitration clause was statutorily barred.2 Second, the court
addressed the contractual claims by considering whether the
arbitration provision was supported by valid consideration and
whether the plaintiff knowingly consented to arbitration.2
The court applied a two-prong test to evaluate whether the
arbitration provision was statutorily barred: (1) whether the
arbitration agreement was broad enough to encompass the
plaintiff's statutory claims; and (2) "whether legal constraints
external to the Parties' agreement foreclosed the arbitration of
those claims."'23 Under the first prong, the plaintiff argued that the
arbitration provision failed specifically to mention the relevant
statutes, and therefore did not encompass her statutory claims.24
The court found, notwithstanding her argument, that the
arbitration clause was sufficiently broad.' Under the second
prong, the court noted that the plaintiff faced a rebuttable
presumption in favor of enforcing the arbitration provision. 6 To
rebut this presumption, the plaintiff was required (1) to
demonstrate that Congress intended to preclude waiver of judicial
remedies for TILA or ECOA rights at issue (2) by showing that
text or legislative history of the statutes indicated such a preclusive
intention, or (3) that there was an inherent conflict between
ECOA by requiring her through the arbitration agreement to waive her statutory
cause of action under TILA. See Green Tree !, 991 F. Supp. at 1413.
19. Green Tree 111, 531 U.S. at 83.
20. Id.
21. Green Tree 1, 991 F. Supp. at 1415.
22. Id. at 1421-23.
23. Id. at 1416.
24. Id.
25. Id. (In light of the language of the arbitration provision providing "[a]ll
disputes, claims or controversies arising from or relating to this Contract," the court
found "the terms of the provision to be sufficiently broad to encompass Plaintiff's
TILA, ECOA, and other claims in this suit, notwithstanding Plaintiffs' protestations
that the provision does not specifically reference applicable statutes").
26. Id. at 1414 ("questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy
regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration") (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).
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permitting arbitration and the purpose of the statutes. 7 The court
found that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate through these means
that Congress intended to preclude waiver, and thus held that
arbitration was not statutorily barred.2 :;
Addressing the plaintiff's contractual claims, the court
examined whether the arbitration provision was supported by
adequate consideration and whether the plaintiff consented to
arbitration. 9  Plaintiff argued that the clause was unenforceable
because, although the plaintiff was required to arbitrate all claims
against the defendant, the defendant was permitted to choose
between resolving its claims against the plaintiff by arbitration or
trial.3" In finding that consideration was adequate, the court
considered dispositive an applicable Alabama law which did not
require mutuality of consideration.3 The court then found that
the plaintiff gave adequate consent to the arbitration provision and
noted that her failure to read the agreement before signing did not
make the agreement unenforceable. a2 Thus, the court held that
the arbitration provision was supported by adequate
consideration, which coupled with the plaintiffs consent to render
the agreement enforceable. 3
27. Green Tree 1, 991 F. Supp. at 1417.
28. Id. at 1420.
29. Id. at 1420-21.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1422. Randolph claimed that since the consumer was required to
arbitrate everything, and Green Tree was not required to arbitrate anything, the
contract was void for lack of mutuality of obligation. Id. at 1421. The Court,
however, disagreed saying,
Under Alabama law, mutuality: "[D]oes not mean equal rights
under the contract, or that each party is entitled to the same rights
or covenants under the contract. So long as there is a valuable
consideration moving from one side to the other, or there are
binding promises on the part of each party to the other, there is
adequate consideration for a valid contract."
Green Tree 1, 991 F. Supp. at 1421 (quoting Marcrum v. Embry, 282 So. 2d
49 (1973)).
32. Id. at 1423.
33. d. at 1420-21.
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The court dismissed the plaintiff's suit with prejudice and
compelled her to submit her claims to binding arbitration.34 Later,
the court denied the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration.35
B. Eleventh Circuit-Green Tree II
Randolph appealed the district court's decision to the
Eleventh Circuit,36 contending that the arbitration clause was
enforceable.37
In evaluating whether TILA precluded the enforcement of
the arbitration provision, the court noted at the outset of its
analysis that there was a strong federal policy in favor of enforcing
arbitration provisions.38  Despite this strong policy, the court
emphasized that procedural flaws, such as hefty arbitration costs
and "steep filing fees," could so burden a plaintiff as to prevent her
from exercising her statutory rights.39 In such cases, the court will
not reach the question of whether TILA precludes enforcement of
the arbitration provision.4" Rather, the arbitration provision will
not be enforced when it fails to provide "minimum guarantees"
34. Randolph v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 991 F. Supp. 1410, 1424-25 (M.D. Ala.
1997).
35. Id. at 1425-26.
36. Randolph v. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Alabama, 178 F.3d 1149, 1152 (11th Cir.
1999) [hereinafter Green Tree Ill.
37. Id. at 1158. Before addressing the enforceability of the arbitration provision,
the court considered Green Tree's argument that the decision of the district court
was not appealable because it was not a "final decision." Id. at 1153. Green Tree
argued that the court should adopt a distinction validated by other Circuit Courts of
Appeal between "embedded" and "independent" proceedings. Id. Embedded
proceedings are those where the motion to compel arbitration is one issue among
others in a broader action. Id. Embedded proceedings are treated as interlocutory
and are non-appealable. Id. Independent proceedings are those where the motion to
compel arbitration is the only issue before the court. Green Tree II, 178 F.3d at 1153.
A decision in an independent proceeding is appealable as a "final" decision.
Although the court recognized that some circuits had adopted the
embedded/independent distinction, this distinction was not adopted by the Eleventh
Circuit. Id. at 1153-54. The court instead held that any decision which effectively
disposed of all issues framed by the litigation and left nothing for the court to do but
execute the judgment, was a final decision which could be appealed. Id. at 1155-57.
On this basis, the court held that it did have jurisdiction to hear Randolph's appeal.
See id. at 1153-57.
38. Id. at 1157.
39. Id.
40. Green Tree 11, 178 F.3d at 1159.
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that the plaintiff's rights can be vindicated without imposing
burdensome costs.4 The court noted several features present in
the Green Tree arbitration clause which presented the potential
for such burdensome costs to the litigant: (1) the clause was silent
about the payment of filing fees and costs of arbitration; (2) there
was no provision for waiver of costs in cases of financial hardship;
(3) no mention was made as to whether consumers, if they
prevailed, would be saddled with fees and costs in excess of the
award; and (4) the clause did not specify what, if any, rules would
guide the arbitration process4 2 On these grounds, the court held
that "the arbitration clause in this case is unenforceable, because it
fails to provide the minimum guarantees required to ensure that
Randolph's ability to vindicate her statutory rights will not be
undone by steep filing fees, steep arbitrators' fees, or other high
costs of arbitration.4 3
The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court and held
that the arbitration provision was unenforceable' Because the
court decided the case on the "minimum guarantees" issue, it did
not reach the question of whether TILA precluded all arbitration
agreements.45
C. United States Supreme Court-Green Tree III
On December 11, 2000, the Supreme Court, by a five to
four vote, affirmed in part and reversed in part the ruling of the
Eleventh Circuit 6 The Court, affirmed the Eleventh Circuit's
holding that a dismissal with prejudice related to granting a motion
to compel arbitration was an appealable "final decision."47 The
Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit's determination that the
arbitration provision was unenforceable because it failed to
protect affirmatively a party from potentially steep arbitration
costs
4S
4L Id. at 1157.
42. Id. at 1158.
43. Id. (emphasis added).
44. Id. at 1159.
45. Id.
46. Green Tree 111, 531 U.S. 79, 82 (2000).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 90.
2002]
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After citing the strong federal policy in favor of enforcing
arbitration provisions,49 the Court stated that it had in the past
rejected "generalized attacks on arbitration that rest[ed] on
'suspicion of arbitration as a method of weakening the protections
afforded in the substantive law to would-be complainants.' 50 The
Court then held that a two-step analysis was applicable to the
instant case.51 First, the Court considered whether the parties
agreed to submit their claims to arbitration.52 Second, the Court
considered whether Congress had "evinced an intention to
preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at
issue., 53 The Court found that neither prong was at issue on
appeal since it was undisputed that the parties agreed to arbitrate
all claims related to the contract, including claims involving
statutory rights, and Randolph did not contend that TILA evinced
an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies.54
The substance of the plaintiff's argument was, therefore,
not pointed toward either of the applicable prongs: the plaintiff
instead argued that the arbitration agreement's silence, with
respect to costs and fees, created a risk of incurring prohibitive
arbitration expenses, leaving her unable to vindicate her statutory
rights in the arbitral forum. The Court rejected this
argument saying potentially prohibitive costs were not enough to
invalidate the arbitration provision." "The record reveals only the
arbitration agreement's silence on the subject, and that fact alone
is plainly insufficient to render it unenforceable. The 'risk' that
Randolph will be saddled with prohibitive costs is too speculative
to justify the invalidation of an arbitration agreement., 57  The
Court held that where a party seeks to invalidate an arbitration
agreement because of potentially prohibitive costs, that party
"bears the burden of showing the likelihood of incurring such
49. Id. at 89.
50. Id. at 90 (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490
U.S. 477,481 (1989)).
51. Id.
52. Green Tree 111, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 91.
57. Id.
552 [Vol. 6
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costs."8 The case was remanded to the Eleventh Circuit for
further proceedings consistent vith the Supreme Court's holding.s9
The Supreme Court took special note that the existence of
large arbitration costs that could create a likelihood that a litigant
would be precluded from effectively -vindicating her federal
statutory rights might render an arbitration agreement
unenforceable." This "likelihood" standard,"1 however, did not
permit Randolph to make such a showing in the instant case. 2
Randolph submitted evidence to the district Court of the
American Arbitration Association's (AAA) minimum filing fees,"
a newspaper article quoting an AAA executive as to the average
costs of arbitration,' and a list of fees incurred in cases involving
other arbitrations.65 Nevertheless, the Court found this evidence
58. Green Tree 111, 531 U.S. 79,91-92 (2000).
59. Id. On remand, the plaintiff did not attempt to present evidence that there
was a "likelihood" that she would incur costs prohibiting her from vindicating her
statutory rights. See Randolph v. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Alabama, 244 F3d 814, 817
(11th Cir. 2001) [hereinafter Green Tree 11]. Rather, the plaintiff claimed that the
arbitration provision precluded her from xindicating her statutory rights to bring a
class action suit under TILA. Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (2000) (TILA caps the
statutory damages available in a TILA class action). Although the court
acknowledged that the text of TILA specifically contemplates class actions, the court
found a distinction between having access to a litigation tool and having the right to
exercise it:
'[W]e recognize, of course, that a class action is an available,
important means of remedying violations of the TILA. However,
there exists a difference between the availability of the class action
tool, and possessing a blanket right to that tool under any
circumstance.... An intent to create such a 'blanket right,' a non-
waivable right, to litigate by class action cannot be gleaned from
the text and the legislative history of the TILA.'
Green Tree MV, 244 F.3d at S17 (quoting Boven v. First Family Fin. Servs.,
Inc., 233 F-3d 1331, 1337-38 (11th Cir. 2000)) (citations omitted).
Accordingly, the court held that Randoph did not "carry her
burden of shoxing either that Congress intended to create a non-waivable
right to bring TILA claims in the form of a class action, or that arbitration
was 'inherently inconsistent' with the TILA enforcement scheme."
Green Tree 117 244 F.3d at 817-18.
60. Green Tree 111, 531 U.S. at 90.
61. See infra notes 155-62 and accompanying text.
62. Green Tree 111, 531 U.S. at 90.
63. Id. at 91 n.6 (indicating that the filing fee for the AAA was $500 for a claim
under $10,000).
64. Id. (indicating that the average arbitral fee is $700 per day).
65. Id.
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provided "no basis on which to ascertain the actual costs and fees
to which Randolph would be subject in arbitration."66
Justice Ginsburg dissented on the ground that the majority
opinion required a plaintiff "either to submit to arbitration without
knowing who [would] pay for the forum or to demonstrate up
front that the costs, if imposed on the plaintiff, [would] be
prohibitive., 67 Ginsburg's dissent argued that the majority opinion
blended two discrete inquiries: the adequacy of the arbitral forum
to adjudicate the claims at issue and the accessibility of the arbitral
forum to the party resisting arbitration. 68 Ginsburg argued that
although it may be proper to assign the burden of proof to the
party resisting arbitration with regard to the first inquiry, 69 the
Court should not require the resisting party to establish that its
access to the arbitral forum would be prohibited."0 Since, in
Ginsburg's opinion, the Court must determine whether the forum
is accessible before it can determine whether it is adequate, the
majority "reached out prematurely to resolve the matter in the
lender's favor.",71
III. BACKGROUND LAW
A. The FAA-History and Purpose
Arbitration has been used to resolve disputes at least since
the time of ancient Greece when "wise men" would travel the land
and settle disputes for a fee.72 In medieval times, arbitration was
primarily used to resolve disputes arising in the business context.73
Similarly, the United States Congress passed the FAA74 in 1925, at
66. Id.
67. Id. at 93 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
68. Green Tree II1, 531 U.S. at 93 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
69. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
70. See id. at 93-94 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 96 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
72. Preston Douglas Wigner, Comment, The United States Supreme Court's
Expansive Approach to the Federal Arbitration Act A Look at the Past, Present, and
Future of Section 2, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 1499, 1502 (1995).
73. Id. at 1502.
74. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000).
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least in part, in an attempt to provide an efficient method for
businesses to settle disputes among themselves."
Initially, arbitration agreements subject to the FAA were
presumed to be the product of arms-length negotiations between
parties with relatively equal bargaining power. " The passage of
the FAA was intended to lend formal credence to arbitration
clauses in commercial contracts:' and to relieve the judicial
hostility toward such clauses7 Section 2 of the FAA provides that
arbitration provisions are valid, irrevocable, and enforceable and
can be invalidated only upon such grounds as exist at law or equity
for the revocation of any contract.' On the basis of the FAA and
the supporting legislative history, the Supreme Court has
recognized that there is a "strong federal policy favoring
arbitration. 'SO
75. See Shelly Smith, Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Contracts:
Consumer Protection and the Circumvention of the Judicial System, 50 DEPAUL L.
REV. 1191, 1191 (2001) ("[A]rbitration was initially created so that parties, with equal
bargaining power, could reduce the costs of litigation."); see also Emily Madoff,
Arbitration Clauses Lethal to Class Actions, Consuwr Contract Ternms Insulate
Businesses From Courts, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 13, 2001, at s3 (explaining arbitration clauses
originally "meant to be negotiated between relatively sophisticated parties with equal
bargaining power").
76. See Madoff, supra note 75, at s3.
77. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991) (FAA
intended to "place arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other
contracts").
78. See id. (purpose of the FAA "was to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility
to arbitration agreements that had existed at English common law and had b.-en
adopted by American courts, and to place arbitration agreements upon the same
footing as other contracts"); see also, Smith, supra note 75, at 1191 (noting that
judicial hostility toward arbitration clauses carried over from England to the United
States).
79. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000) ("[a] written provision in any maritime transaction or a
contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a
controversy thereafter arising out of such contract ... shall be valid, irrevoeble, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract").
80. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (19S3
("[Q]uestions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for the federal
policy favoring arbitration"); see also Paladino v. Avnet Computer Tech., Inc., 134
F.3d 1054, 1062 (11th Cir. 1998) (citing a "strong federal policy favoring arbitration").
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B. Public Policy Arguments
Behind the "strong federal policy"'" favoring arbitration
lurks an equally strong and unsettled policy debate." Proponents
of arbitration laud it as a method to cut costs of doing business and
pass the savings to consumers.83 Opponents decry it as a means to
abuse consumers.' In the midst of this debate, the Supreme Court
has stated that it will not invalidate arbitration agreements merely
on the basis of "suspicion of arbitration as a method of weakening
the protections afforded in the substantive law to would-be
complainants. '8 5  But the courts must continue to decide the
validity of consumer arbitration clauses in an atmosphere of
vigorous policy debate.86
1. The Arbitration Advocates
Proponents of arbitration advance simple but compelling
arguments. Arbitration advocates point out that, despite
speculation about bias, consumers fair better in arbitration
proceedings than in court. 7 Studies indicate that in federal court,
corporations prevail eighty-seven percent of the time in suits
against individuals, while in arbitration administered by the
National Arbitration Forum (NAF), corporations prevailed only
sixty-three percent of the time.88 A separate study indicated that
81. See Green Tree 1, 991 F. Supp. 1410, 1414 (M.D. Ala. 1997); see also supra
note 26 and accompanying text.
82- See generally Smith, supra note 75, at 1220-23; Johanna Harrington,
Comment, To Litigate or Arbitrate? No Matter-The Credit Card Industry is
Deciding for You, 2001 J. DISP. RESOL. 101, 116-18 (2001), WL 2001 JDR 101.
83. See Stephen J. Ware, Paying the Price of Process: Judicial Regulation of
Consumer Arbitration Agreements, 2001 J. Disp. RESOL. 89, 90-91 (2001) (noting the
argument that arbitration cuts litigation costs, decreases awards, and passes the
savings on to consumers), WL 2001JDR89.
84. See Smith, supra note 75, at 1220-22 (noting the ways in which arbitration
agreements are used by corporations to abuse consumers).
85. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477,481 (1989).
86. See infra notes 87-127 and accompanying text.
87. See Kristen Porter, Comment, Upholding Precedent: How The U.S. Supreme
Court Should Approach The Green Tree Circuit Split, 26 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
1075, 1077-78 (2000) (discussing the myth that arbitration produces higher win rates
for corporations than do trials).
88. See Porter, supra note 87, at 1077.
556 [Vol. 6
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over ninety percent of participants in arbitration believed their
cases were handled fairly."
Lending more credence to the arguments of arbitration
advocates is the comparative speed of, and strong public
preference for, adjudicating disputes in an arbitral forum: For
example, a typical consumer dispute can be resolved in
approximately half the time of litigation?' Indeed, arbitration is
largely aimed at avoiding this drawback to litigating in the judicial
system." There is also a strong public preference for arbitration?3
One study indicated that fifty-nine percent of Americans would
choose arbitration over litigation. ' When the subjects of that
study were informed that arbitration could cost up to seventy-five
percent less, eighty-two percent favored arbitration?3
2. The Arbitration Opposition
As a foundational matter, critics of arbitration observe that
it strips would-be litigants of the procedural and substantive rights
granted to every citizen by the judicial system." Among the more
notable rights that are commonly lost to arbitration are the right
89. See Eric J. Mogilnicki, High Court's Arbitration Ruling A Boon to Consuter,
Banks, AM. BANIER, Dec. 22,2000, at 12.
90. See Porter, supra note 87, at 1077-78.
91. See Mogilnickd, supra note 89.
92. Former President George HAV. Bush once observed:
[M]ost good lawyers kmow that the civil justice system is out of
control. In the past 20 years the number of civil lawsuits filed in
federal court has more than doubled and today the average case
takes almost a year to be resolved. In the past year alone, the
number of cases pending for up to three years increasced by nearly
15%. That means you can file a suit, have time to enroll in la%,;
school, study three years, graduate, pass the bar and then represent
yourself in the court the day the judgment is handed down.
Matthew C. Bouchard, Note, Randolph v. Green Tree Financial Corp.: Are Consumer
Arbitration Agreements That Are Silent As To The Apportionment of Aribtral
E penses Enforceable?, 4 N.C. BANKING INST. 319, 319 n.1 (2000) (quoting, Why
ADR?, Dispute Resolution Alternatives Supercourse 485, 4S6 (Ellis R. Mirsky chmn.,
1993)).
93. See Porter, supra note 87, at 1101.
94. Id.
95. See id.
96. See Samuel Estreicher and Kenneth J. Turnbull, Pre-Dispute Employmcnt
Arbitration Agreements: Who Pays?, N.Y.U., May 30,2001, at 3.
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to: a jury trial; a public forum for litigation; have the public bear
the cost of litigation; have a written record of the litigation; have
litigation proceedings and results be subject to appellate
review; discovery; present all relevant evidence; bind the arbitral
forum to legal precedent; and bring class action suits.97 With the
tremendous disparity in bargaining power between consumers and
corporations, arbitration provisions drafted by corporations put
even the consumer's method of asserting his rights at the mercy of
the corporation's terms.98
This discrepancy in bargaining power has lead critics to
question the institutional neutrality of arbitration services. 99 Two
prominent arbitration services, the Judicial Arbitration and
Mediation Service (JAMS)" ° and the NAF, i' operate on a for-
97. See id. The loss of the right to bring class action suits in the arbitral forum
was further solidified in the Green Tree remand to the Eleventh Circuit.
Green Tree IV, 244 F.3d 814, 817-18. This decision further disabled the plaintiff from
utilizing a litigation tool whereby the plaintiff, through raising a case on a
contingency fee basis, could bring a claim without incurring prohibitive costs. See
generally Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class
Action, Will the Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 5-9 (2000).
[D]efense counsel and other arbitration advocates readily observe
that arbitration can be used to deter the filing of a class action suit,
or secure dismissal of a class action that was nonetheless brought.
The potential defendants know that because many claims are not
viable if brought individually, plaintiffs will often drop or fail to
initiate claims once it is clear that class relief is unavailable.
Id. at 8-9 (citations omitted).
98. Smith, supra note 75, at 1220-21 (arguing that consumers who have no choice
but to submit to arbitration clauses, are involuntarily stripped of rights beneficial to
consumers).
99. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Do the "Haves" Come out Ahead in Alternative
Judicial Systems: Repeat Players in ADR, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 19, 38-57
(1999).
100. JAMS provides alternative dispute resolution services, claiming a resolution
success rate of ninety percent. See About JAMS, at http://www.jamsadr.coml
who_we_are.asp (last visited, Feb. 23, 2002). JAMS also explicitly encourages
organizations to customize the rules and procedures of the arbitration process.
JUDICIAL ARBITRATION & MEDIATION SERVICES, JAMS ARBITRATION PRACTICE, at
http://www.jamsadr.com/ arb-practice.asp (last visited, Feb. 23, 2002). Arbitration
can take on many faces. It allows parties to custom design the arbitration rules and
procedures to maximize control over the process." Id.
101. The NAF claims to be "one of the world's largest neutral administrators of
arbitration services," and is composed of legal professionals who arbitrate cases
according to the "principle that legal disputes should be decided according to
established legal principles." NATIONAL ARBITRATION FORUM, FREQUENTLY ASKED
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profit basis," 2 and are thereby susceptible to conflicts of interest
when dealing with corporations who frequently use their services
and thus ensure their economic livelihood." 3 The NAF has even
gone so far as to use some of its pro-corporate rules as a marketing
tool for recruiting corporate business."
A final observation of opponents of mandatory consumer
arbitration has been the advantage conveyed to corporations by
their status as "repeat players" in the process of arbitration. "
Repeat players are able to learn from "previous transactions and
[have] the opportunity to develop a rapport with 'institutional
incumbents"' within the arbitral forum."' Consumers, on the
other hand, are usually unfamiliar with the arbitration process and
have no opportunity to gain similar knowledge of the arbitral
process or culture.0 7 In addition, by using one arbitration service,
a corporation can gain institution-specific expertise not available
to a consumer."' Together, these factors can lead to specific
instances of extremely lop-sided pro-corporate outcomes, as
evidenced by statistics disclosed in discovery during a lawsuit in
2000 against First USA Bank, which showed that it won 99.6
percent of the 19,705 arbitration disputes it faced in the previous
two years. 9
C. The Unconscionability Argument
Unconscionability arguments are based on the theory that a
contract (or a provision thereof) is unenforceable if (1) one party
QUESTIONS ABOUT THE FORUM, at http:(I/v,,%.arbitration-forum.comaboutI
questions.asp#27 (last visited, Feb. 23, 2002). The NAF is compensated by filing fees
and hearing fees from the parties filing claims. Md.
102. See Harrington, supra note 82, at 104.
103. See Harrington, supra note 82, at 105 (citing discovery documents in a Texas
class action suit against First USA which showed that First USA paid the NAF $5.3
million between January 199S and November 1999).
104. See Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Mcets the Class
Action, Will the Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1, 72 (200) (noting
that the NAF has "marketed its rules to corporations in part with the assurance that
its rules do not allow for class actions").
105. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 99, at 38-57.
106. See Harrington, supra note 82, at 104.
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. See Madoff, supra note 75, at s14.
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possesses a significantly stronger bargaining position and (2) the
terms of the contract unfairly oppress the party with the weaker
bargaining position."' Unconscionability challenges to arbitration
provisions are most common when there is a contract of adhesion
offered by the stronger party on a take-it-or-leave-it basis."' The
root theory of unconscionability is that the party with lesser
bargaining power is deprived of any meaningful choice in signing
the contract. 1 2 The result is a contract that is unenforceable for
lack of consent.'
3
In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., the Supreme
Court squarely addressed the unconscionability argument in the
arbitration context."4 There, the plaintiff filed suit for violation of
his rights"5 under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. " 6
Pursuant to his employment contract, Gilmer was required to
settle all disputes through binding arbitration. "' Gilmer
challenged the enforceability of the arbitration provision because,
inter alia, he was compelled by his employer as a condition of
employment to sign the contract containing the provision."8 In
holding that Gilmer was bound by the arbitration agreement," 9 the
Court noted that "[m]ere inequality in bargaining power .... is not
a sufficient reason to hold that arbitration agreements are never
enforceable.' 2 2 But the use of unconscionability as a means of
invalidating arbitration agreements was not foreclosed; rather it
was restricted to examination on a case-by-case basis.'
110. Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96
HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1177-79 (1983).
111. See Bouchard, supra note 92, at 330-32.
112. See Madoff, supra note 75, at s3.
113. Id.
114. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
115. Id. at 23.
116. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000).
117. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23.
118. Id. at 33.
119. ld. at 35.
120. Id. at 33.
121. Id. A "claim of unequal bargaining power is best left for resolution in specific
cases." Id.
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D. The (Latent) Constitutional Argunzent
A final argument remains for invalidating arbitration
clauses within consumer agreements: constitutional supremacy.)%
The Supremacy Clause makes the Constitution superior to any
other law."z  The Seventh Amendment to the Constitution
guarantees that "[i]n suits at common law, where the value in
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury
shall be preserved." '  The Court has found that some
constitutional rights can only be waived by the free and deliberate
choice of a person who is free of intimidation, deception, or
coercion and made aware of the nature of the waived right and the
consequence of waiving it.' - The presence of a contract of
adhesion coupled with the discrepancy in bargaining power giving
rise to an unconscionability argument draws into question the
purity of the "consent" given by a consumer to waive his
constitutional rights." 6  If the consent does not meet the
requirements for waiver, arbitration clauses may be held to violate
the constitutional grants under the Seventh Amendment.""
122. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2; see also Smith, supra note 75, at 1245 (arguing that
Congress may have violated the Supremacy Clause through the adoption of the
FAA)-
123. U.S. CONST. art. V1, § 2. "This Constitution, and the Lavis of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof.... shall be the supreme Law of the
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." M.
124. U.S. CONsT. amend. VII.
125. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (19S6). In relation to the rights
guaranteed by the Miranda warnings the court stated:
First, the relinquishment of the [Constitutional] right must have
been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and
deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception.
Second, the waiver must have been made with a full awareness of
both the nature of the right being abandoned and the
consequences of the decision to abandon it.
ILd.
126. Smith, supra note 75, at 1245.
127. Id.
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IV. ANALYSIS
A. Subsequent Cases Interpreting Green Tree III
In Green Tree 111, the Supreme Court left open the
possibility that large arbitration costs could preclude a litigant
from effectively vindicating her federal statutory rights and thus
render an arbitration provision unenforceable, but it held that the
record in that case did not show Randolph would bear such
costs. 128  Interestingly, the Court stated, "[h]ow detailed the
showing of prohibitive expense must be before the party seeking
arbitration must come forward with contrary evidence is a matter
we need not discuss., 129 The Court's silence on this matter leaves
unsettled the standard for evaluating when costs are prohibitive. 3
Federal courts have since sought to flesh out a workable
standard.13" '
In Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Systems, Inc., 3 2 the
Fourth Circuit faced the question of whether a cost-splitting
provision requiring an employee to share in the total costs of
arbitration rose to the level of prohibitive costs. 33 The court
interpreted Green Tree III as emphasizing two guiding principles:
(1) there is a strong federal policy favoring arbitration and (2)
determinations of what constitutes a prohibitive cost should be
based on the facts of individual cases.'34 Bradford argued that
although he initiated arbitration, his preference was for a judicial
forum.'35 The court noted that in the present case, Bradford
offered no evidence that he was unable to pay the fee billed by the
AAA,'36 or that the fee-splitting provision itself deterred him from
pursuing his statutory claim.'37 To the contrary, Bradford initiated
128. Green Tree III, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000). Randolph argued merely that the
silence of the provision with respect to costs and fees created the risk that she would
be required to bear prohibitive arbitration costs. Id. (emphasis added).
129. Id. at 92.
130. See id.
131. See infra notes 132-62 and accompanying text.
132. Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Sys., Inc., 238 F.3d 549 (4th Cir. 2001).
133. Id. at 556-57.
134. Id. at 557.
135. Id. at 558 n.6.
136. Id. at 558 (Bradford was required to pay $4,470.88 by the AAA pursuant to
his arbitration).
137. Id. at 558.
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the arbitration and conceded that he received a full and fair
hearing."s The court instructively said in a footnote that Bradford
failed to offer any comparative information as to the cost of
litigating his case in a judicial forum,"' that he was earning
$115,000 per year in base salary at the time of his discharge," 9 and
that it "made sense" that a person claiming a financial burden
should raise his objections including a specific forecast of the costs
and his burden prior to filing for arbitration.4 ' Accordingly, the
court formally adopted a "case-by-case inquiry" rule and upheld
the fee-splitting provision.4 2
Some courts have stated that a mechanism allowing non-
payment of costs by indigent claimants, even if this mechanism is
not available until after a dispute arises, may defeat an argument
for prohibitive costs. 43 In Bank One v. Coates, " a Mississippi
district court noted that a provision of an arbitration service
providing for waiver of costs by indigent defendants, when coupled
with a provision that the prevailing party would receive attorney's
fees, was sufficient to overcome plaintiffs argument that
prohibitive costs denied him access to an arbitral forum. 5 In
Roberson v. Clear Channel Broadcasting, Inc.,'1 a Florida district
court held that the plaintiff's argument of prohibitive costs was
defeated because the defendant, both in its motion to compel
arbitration and in its reply brief, stipulated that it would pay the
plaintiff's costs of arbitration.147
138. Bradford, Inc.. 238 F.3d at 559.
139. Id. at 558 n.6.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 558 n.7.
142. Id. at 559; accord Boyd v. The Town of Hayneville, Alabama, 144 F. Supp. 2d
1272, 1280 (M.D. Ala. 2001) (adopting the same case-by-case standard and requiring
a specific shoving of financial costs, comparative data on the cost of litigation, and
ability to pay).
143. See Bank One v. Coates, 125 F. Supp. 2d 819, 834-35 (S.D. Miss. 2001); see
also Roberson v. Clear Channel Broadcasting, Inc., 144 F. Supp. 2d 1371, 1373 (S.D.
Fla. 2001) (upholding the arbitration provision). In Roberson, the court noted as
persuasive that in defendant's motion to compel arbitration and reply brief,
defendant stipulated to pay plaintiffs costs. 144 F. Supp. 2d at 1373.
144. Bank One, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 834-35.
145. Id.
146. Roberson, 144 F. Supp. 2d at 1373.
147. Id.
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The Eleventh Circuit, however, has not been so generous
to defendants on this issue. 14  In Perez v. Globe Airport Security
Services, Inc.,49 the Eleventh Circuit addressed a similar offer to
alleviate costs by the defendant. 50 There, Globe stipulated that it
was willing to forgo use of the AAA, as required in the original
agreement, in favor of less expensive, private arbitration. 5 ' The
court rejected this argument and found that Globe's proposal
constituted an offer to modify the original agreement.'52
Therefore, Perez's rejection of Globe's offer to modify left the
original contract intact.'53  Ultimately, the court held the
arbitration agreement was unenforceable because, although Globe
had previously agreed to abide by AAA rules, it included a cost-
splitting provision in the agreement that contradicted the AAA
rules allowing the arbitrator to award fees and costs at his
discretion.'54
B. The Emerging Standard
On the basis of the treatment of Green Tree III by
subsequent courts, three principles emerge. First, the courts
appear committed to resolving the issue of whether there are
prohibitive cost on a case-by-case basis.' 5 Second, while utilizing
this case-by-case review, courts seem to require the plaintiff to
make a showing of specific costs that will be incurred in the
arbitral forum, comparative costs of pursuing the claim in a judicial
forum, and evidence of the plaintiff's ability to pay.'56 Third,
148. Perez v. Globe Airport Security Servs., Inc., 253 F.3d 1280 (11th Cir. 2001).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1284-85.
151. Id. at 1284-85 n.2.
152 Id.
153. Id.
154. Perez v. Globe Airport Security Servs., Inc., 253 F.3d 1280, 1286 (11th Cir.
2001).
155. Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Sys., Inc., 238 F.3d 549, 559 (4th Cir.
2001) (adopting the same case-by-case standard and requiring a specific showing of
financial costs, comparative data on the cost of litigation, and ability to pay); accord
Perez, 253 F.3d at 1284-85; Boyd v. The Town of Hayneville, Alabama, 144 F. Supp.
2d 1272, 1280 (M.D. Ala. 2001); Bank One v. Coates, 125 F. Supp. 2d 819, 834-35
(S.D. Miss. 2001); Roberson v. Clear Channel Broadcasting, Inc., 144 F. Supp. 2d
1371, 1373 (S.D. Fla. 2001).
156. See Bradford, 238 F.3d at 559; accord Perez, 253 F.3d at 1284-85; Boyd, 144 F.
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courts prefer that a plaintiff present evidence of prohibitive costs
before contesting arbitration."
A final, and still evolving, issue concerns the effect of post-
dispute offers by the defendant to reduce or eliminate the
plaintiff's fees and costs. 5 Some courts have held that these
provisions effectively preclude a plaintiff from advancing a
prohibitive costs argument.'59 The Eleventh Circuit, however, has
found that these provisions constitute an offer to modify the
contract, which may be rejected by the plaintiff." 't Once the
plaintiff rejects the offer, he may then proceed with his prohibitive
cost argument.1 6 1 It appears that most courts vll not invalidate an
arbitration provision for reason of prohibitive costs if at the time
of signing the agreement there exists an allowance for waiver of
costs for indigent plaintiffs, or if the defendant includes a provision
prior to signing that it vAll pay part or all of the plaintiff's
arbitration costs. 62
V. IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In 1997, many financial lender institutions had already
begun to include arbitration clauses in their consumer contracts
due to the pro-lender decisions rendered in federal and state
court.1 63  Four years later the trend seems to have continued."'
Supp. 2d at 1280; Bank One, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 834-35; Roberson, 144 F. Supp. 2d at
1373.
157. Bank One, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 834-35 (noting that since plaintiff brought the
arbitration dispute, this evidenced an ability to pay).
158. Compare Perez, 253 F.3d at 12,4-S5 (not alloving post-agreement change to
affect the determination of whether costs prohibitive) with Roberson, 144 F. Supp. 2d
at 1373 (upholding the arbitration provision and noting as persuasive that in
defendant's motion to compel arbitration and reply brief, defendant stipulated to pay
plaintiff's costs).
159. Roberson, 144 F. Supp. 2d at 1373.
160. Id. (noting that defendant stipulated to pay the plaintiff's costs and holding
that costs were therefore not prohibitive to plaintiff).
161. Perez, 253 F.3d at 1284-85 n.2.
162- See Bank One, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 834-35 (rule allowing for waiver of costs by
indigent defendants was a factor in determining that costs vere not prohibitive of
plaintiff's access to an arbitral forum).
163. See Alan S. Kaplinsky and Mark J. Levin, Consumer Financial Serviccs
Arbitration: Current Trends And Developments, 53 BUs. L'xW. 1075, 1075-76 (1930.
164. See Harrington, supra note 82, at 101-07 (discussing judicial decisions on
consumer arbitration clauses that have continued on a pro-corporate trend, and more
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Today, corporations like American Express, Discover, MBNA
America Bank, and Bank One have all added retroactively
effective arbitration clauses to their credit card agreements.'65 The
startling rapidity with which consumer loan corporations have
included retroactive arbitration provisions in their credit card
contracts has drawn the interest of law professors, employees of
the AAA, and consumer lender legal counsels. 16   With the
increasing commonality of arbitration clauses in the financial
contracts, an analysis of the impact of the Green Tree III decision
on the validity of such arbitration clauses appears ripe for
consideration by financial institutions.167
A. Safe Features of an Arbitration Provision
A commercial entity seems unlikely to face a per se ban on
cost-splitting clauses in an arbitration provision. 6 1 In Bradford,
the cost-splitting provision which the court upheld stated, "[tjo
ensure that the Arbitrator is not biased in any way in favor of one
party because that party is paying all or most of the Arbitration
fees and costs, the parties shall share equally the fees and costs of
the Arbitrator.',169 Since the emphasis by the Green Tree III Court
was pointed squarely at whether the particular would-be litigant
and more financial corporations that have responded by including arbitration clauses
in their contracts).
165. See Harrington, supra note 82, at 102; see also Jess Bravin, Banks Seek to Halt
Suits by Cardholders, WALL ST. J., May 2, 2001, at Bi.
166. Jess Bravin, Banks Seek to Halt Suits by Cardholders, WALL ST. J., May 2,
2001, at B1.
167. Id.
168. See Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Sys., Inc., 238 F.3d 549, 557 (4th
2001) (fee-splitting provision reckoned to be similar to the "silence" of cost allocation
in Green Tree III, therefore no per-se prohibition will apply). But see supra notes
148-54 and accompanying text (discussing the danger that cost-splitting provisions
may conflict with a co-operating clause requiring the parties to abide by all rules of
the arbitration service, thus the cost-splitting provision can render the entire
arbitration clause unenforceable).
169. Bradford, 238 F.3d at 551 (emphasis in original). A curious person might
question the sincerity of Rockwell's proclamation that its motivation behind
including this clause was solely the protection of arbitrator neutrality. The argument
that arbitrators are biased in favor of the commercial litigant is based not upon who
pays the arbitrator, but who selects the arbitration service for bulk arbitration
contracts. See Harrington, supra note 82, at 105 (citing discovery in a Texas class
action suit against First USA that showed First USA paid the NAF $5.3 million
between January 1998 and November 1999).
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could actually afford to pay for arbitration, 7d it seems unlikely that
cost-splitting provisions will be proscribed across-the-board.'
The guiding principle of Green Tree III is that in order for an
arbitration clause to be held unenforceable, regardless of how
costs are allocated between the parties, those specific costs must
actually be prohibitive for the plaintiff, not speculatively
prohibitive for any plaintiff. 7 2
Courts have further enforced the principle that cost must
be individually and actually prohibitive by holding enforceable
clauses which require the losing party to pay all of the attorney's
fees incurred in the arbitration contest.' In Bank One, the
plaintiff failed to give notice of his refusal to accept the new
arbitration provision to Bank One, and was therefore deemed
bound by the terms of the provision. 4 The new provision stated
that the arbitration proceeding would be bound by the code of
procedure of the NAF, but did not disclose what those procedures
entailed.'75 The plaintiff later discovered that the NAF procedures
included a rule allowing the prevailing party to recover its
attorney's fees.'76 The court found that the Green Tree III
principle of individualized determination compelled it to hold that
a fee-shifting provision did not render the clause unenforceable.'
B. Dangerous Features of an Arbitration Provision
Critical to the defendant's success in Bank One was a
clause allowing waiver of attorney's fees and arbitration costs for
indigent parties.'" Similar clauses have been cited by other courts
as an important factor when considering whether a cost allocation
170. Green Tree III, 531 U.S. 79,92 (2000).
171. Bradford, 238 F.3d at 557.
172. Id. In noting the rationale of Green Tree III, the Fourth Circuit here
emphasized that the speculative possibility of prohibitive costs w'as irrelevant. Id. It
is costs actually prohibitive that are of concern to the court. Id.
173. Bank One v. Coates, 125 F. Supp. 2d 819, 35 (S.D. Mis. 2001 .
174. Id. at 826.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 835.
177. Id. (holding a fee-shifting provision, without evidence that an individual
plaintiff vill incur prohibitive costs, is insufficient to invalidate an arbitration clause).
178. Id.
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scheme prohibited access to the arbitral forum.'79 Given the
Green Tree III Court's emphasis on individualized determinations
of ability to pay in evaluating whether arbitration costs are
prohibitive, 8 ' a provision relieving an indigent plaintiff of costs
upon a showing of indigence would appear to weigh favorably for
a commercial litigant.' Therefore, a clause allowing for waiver of
filing fees and arbitration costs, and nullification of any fee
allocation provision for an indigent plaintiff is likely to strengthen
the enforceability of an arbitration provision.'82 The absence of
such a provision could render an arbitration provision
unenforceable. 83
C. Legislative Re-Tooling of the FAA is Looming
Some Congressmen have recently expressed concern that
arbitration provisions in consumer contracts entered into before
an actual dispute arises have eroded the rights of consumers. 4
Sponsors of the "Consumer Credit Fair Dispute Resolution Act"'8 5
were particularly troubled by the practice of credit card companies
and consumer credit lenders of inserting mandatory binding
arbitration clauses in their consumer agreements without
consumers' knowledge or consent.8 6 The Act was intended to
amend the FAA by inserting pro-consumer language that would
prohibit arbitration of a consumer credit contract unless the
179. See Roberson, 144 F. Supp. 2d at 1373 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (citing defendant's
willingness to pay the arbitration costs of the would-be litigant as influential in its
holding that the plaintiff was not denied access to the arbitral forum); Perez, 253 F.3d
at 1284-85 (11th Cir. 2001) (noting in dicta that the defendant's offer to pay the
plaintiff's arbitration costs was relevant to determining whether the costs were
prohibitive of the plaintiff's vindication of rights). Note that these cases are
addressing the impact of indigent plaintiff exception clauses on whether individual
plaintiffs would face prohibitive costs, not whether the cost-allocation provisions are
per se invalid.
180. Green Tree 111, 531 U.S. 79, 92 (2000).
181. See Roberson, 144 F. Supp. 2d at 1373; Perez, 253 F.3d at 1284-85.
182. Perez, 253 F.3d at 1284-85.
183. Id.
184. See Madoff, supra note 75, at s3. On January 25,2001, United States Senators
Russ Feingold (D-Wis) and Patrick Leahy (D-Vt) initiated legislation to amend the
FAA. Id.
185. S. 192, 107th Cong. (1st Sess. 2001) (tabled).
186. Madoff, supra note 75, at s3.
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arbitration agreement was entered into after the dispute arose. 7
A similar bill was introduced in the House of Representatives in
1999, which would have prohibited pre-dispute mandatory
arbitration between commercial entities and consumers.'
However, neither the Senate nor the House voted on these
proposals.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although the value, purpose, and fairness of arbitration are
debated,"5 9 the Supreme Court signaled in Green Tree III that
contractual arbitration provisions are here to stay."' If a
consumer signs an arbitration provision, the provision is
enforceable, unless the consumer demonstrates that he is (not
merely that he might be) precluded from the arbitral forum by
arbitration fees.19 Subsequent courts have rigorously upheld this
process of individualized evaluation' 2 Absent such individualized
showing by a consumer, the arbitration provision will be held
enforceable. 93
Despite what appears to be a strongly pro-commercial
decision by the Supreme Court, commercial entities must not take
187. S. 192, 107th Cong. (lst Sess. 2001) (tabled). The relevant portion of the
amendment would be inserted after the introduction of 9 U.S.C. section 2, and vould
read:
Notvthstanding the preceding sentence, a written provision in any
consumer credit contract evidencing a transaction invoking
commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising
out of the contract, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part
thereof, shall not be valid or enforceable.
Nothing in this section shall prohibit the enforcement of any
witten agreement to settle by arbitration a controversy arising out
of a consumer credit contract, if such written agreement has been
entered into by the parties to the consumer credit contract after
the controversy has arisen.
Id.
185. H.R. 2258,106th Cong. (1999) (introduced by Luis Guitierrez, D-Ill).
189. See supra notes 81-127 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 46-66 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 132-54 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 132-47 and accompanying text.
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the Court's decision as license to abuse consumers.'94 Arbitration
provisions may yet be held unenforceable on an individualized
showing of prohibitive costs.1' A clause shifting fees to the losing
party, or splitting arbitration fees between parties regardless of the
case outcome will not encounter a per se prohibition because the
determination is made case-by-case.'96 But it seems unwise to
leave out provisions allowing indigent plaintiffs to waive
arbitration fees.197
The Court has significantly expanded the ability of
corporations to impose upon consumers the requirement that all
disputes be litigated in a private, corporate-funded arbitration
hearing, but consumer abuse will not be tolerated.' 98 The present
Court has reserved the opportunity to hold unenforceable
arbitration provisions that cross the line.' 99 A future Court may be
one vote away from finding unconstitutional arbitration provisions
that fail to give consumers sufficient notice and opportunity to
reject the provision. °"
JASON BRADLEY KAY
194. See supra notes 178-83 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 181-83 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 168-77 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 178-83 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 46-71 and accompanying text.
199. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
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